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The Secure Anonymised Information Linkage (SAIL) Databank is a national data safe haven of
de identified datasets principally about the population of Wales, made available in anonymised form
to researchers across the world. It was established to enable the vast arrays of data collected about
individuals in the course of health and other public service delivery to be made available to answer
important questions that could not otherwise be addressed without prohibitive effort. The SAIL
Databank is the bedrock of other funded centres relying on the data for research.
Approach
SAIL is a data repository surrounded by a suite of physical, technical and procedural control
measures embodying a proportionate privacy-by-design governance model, informed by public en-
gagement, to safeguard the data and facilitate data utility. SAIL operates on the UK Secure Re-
search Platform (SeRP), which is a customisable technology and analysis platform. Researchers
access anonymised data via this secure research environment, from which results can be released
following scrutiny for disclosure risk. SAIL data are being used in multiple research areas to evaluate
the impact of health and social exposures and policy interventions.
Discussion
Lessons learned and their applications include: managing evolving legislative and regulatory
requirements; employing multiple, tiered security mechanisms; working hard to increase analytical
capacity efficiency; and developing a multi-faceted programme of public engagement. Further work
includes: incorporating new data types; enabling alternative means of data access; and developing
further efficiencies across our operations.
Conclusion
SAIL represents an ongoing programme of work to develop and maintain an extensive, whole
population data resource for research. Its privacy-by-design model and UK SeRP technology have
received international acclaim, and we continually endeavour to demonstrate trustworthiness to sup-
port data provider assurance and public acceptability in data use. We strive for further improvement
and continue a mutual learning process with our contemporaries in this rapidly developing field.
Introduction
The Secure Anonymised Information Linkage (SAIL) Data-
bank was established by the Population Data Science group
at Swansea University (Wales, UK) in 2007 with core funding
from Health and Care Research Wales (HCRW) of the Welsh
Government. SAIL was created in recognition of the immense,
untapped research potential of individual-level data collected
in the course of health and other public service delivery. Its
predicate was that making these vast arrays of data accessible
safely would open up ways to answer important questions that
could not otherwise be addressed without prohibitive effort and
cost. SAIL is the bedrock of further Population Data Science
investments hosted at Swansea University, including the Eco-
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nomic & Social Research Council funded Administrative Data
Research Wales [1] and the Medical Research Council funded
Health Data Research UK collaboration between Swansea Uni-
versity and Queen’s University Belfast (Northern Ireland, UK)
[2]. Through these and other developments, the scope of SAIL
data has expanded to include administrative data that were
not previously accessible (such as education, housing and em-
ployment) and emerging health data types (such as genomic,
free-text and imaging). In this way, SAIL is an increasingly
rich resource for population data science – ‘the science of data
about people’, including wider factors that influence wellbeing
[3]. This accords with the need for a better understanding
of ‘the complex array of interlinking factors that influence the
health of the public’, identified by the UK Academy of Medical
Sciences [4]. These issues transcend traditional disciplinary,
sectoral and geographical boundaries and require integrating
aspects of natural, social and health sciences, an aspiration
to shift focus to prevention and early intervention to optimise
resource utilisation and achieve population impact.
The aim of this paper is to present a profile of the SAIL
Databank including its population setting, operating model,
underpinning architecture and technology, data governance,
data linkage, data sources, how data access is enabled and
examples of noteworthy outputs.
Approach
Population setting
The SAIL Databank is a national data safe haven of de iden-
tified datasets about the population of Wales, made available
in anonymised form for research. Wales is a principality in the
United Kingdom with a population of 3.18 million in 2018 [5].
The main urban centres in terms of population numbers are the
capital Cardiff, followed by Swansea and Newport across south
and west Wales, and Wrexham in the north. In terms of area,
the majority of Wales is rural, particularly non-industrialised
mid-Wales and where much of the land is agricultural. SAIL
data encompasses the population of Wales, and because the
data are longitudinal, it includes records of over 5 million peo-
ple who have been recipients of public services in Wales.
Operating model
SAIL data are housed in a data repository surrounded by a
suite of physical, technical and procedural control measures,
which taken together comprise a privacy-by-design, propor-
tionate governance model [6,7]. This will be described more
fully below. Here we describe the reasoning for choosing to es-
tablish SAIL as a data repository and the principles that guide
its operation.
In seeking to establish a system for making population data
available for research in anonymised form, there were numer-
ous factors to be considered. We consulted widely with govern-
ment, regulatory and professional agencies, and we sought to
learn from existing systems, mainly in other parts of the world
with long-established data centres [8-10]. The main factors
that guided our decision to create a repository, rather than
a distributed model with federated data access, were largely
pragmatic i.e. they were a combination of problem solving,
gaining the advantage of available opportunities, minimising
the demand on data providers and maximising efficiency.
Through discussions with stakeholders, we concluded that
many public sector IT systems were not sufficiently stable to
cope with data access and processing at source. Coupled with
this, we were able to develop technical processes to minimise
the demand on data providers transferring their data to SAIL.
We had the advantages of high performance computing capac-
ity at Swansea University without which the initial cost of set
up would have been prohibitive, and the availability of a Na-
tional Health Service based Trusted Third Party (TTP) in the
NHS Wales Informatics Service (NWIS) to process identifiable
data for the data provider. As well as enacting the separation
principle by which SAIL does not handle person-identifiable
data (PID), NWIS maintains the Welsh Demographic Service
(WDS) database that acts as a proxy for a Wales population
register, and against which records can be reliably matched.
Further drivers for a repository model were the ability to moni-
tor data quality and completeness, and to apply proportionate
controls on data access. We were able to devise a model that
enables SAIL to hold data in accordance with UK data protec-
tion legislation [11,12], meeting with regulatory requirements
and those of data provider due diligence [6,7]. Importantly,
using a repository model meant that all the data were in place
and readily available for research use, subject to approvals.
Architecture and information technology
SAIL is hosted, managed and provisioned within a tenancy
on the UK Secure Research Platform (SeRP). UK SeRP is
an ISO27001 approved customisable technology and analy-
sis platform with a range of functionalities, developed by the
SAIL technical team [13]. We use the term tenancy to refer
to the particular specifications and services required, including
software preferences and data governance model, of a client
wishing to use the infrastructure. UK SeRP enables multi-
ple, complex datasets to be managed, analysed and shared in
accordance with data provider permissions and jurisdictional
legislative and regulatory requirements (Figure 1). The deci-
sions on which tools are implemented for a particular tenancy
is made between the tenant and UK SeRP taking into account
the requirements of data providers and the regulatory status
of the provision of datasets. Each instance of UK SeRP is con-
trolled by a National Research Data Appliance (NRDA, Figure
2), a set of modules to provide dataset management, access
control, infrastructure management and governance model im-
plementation. NRDA is the control management system, while
UK SeRP is the secure analytic environment for users to access
and conduct research.
Governance, legislation and management
SAIL is classed as an Infrastructure Support Service in the
terms of its funding from HCRW. This means SAIL has a
fundamental role in enabling research to take place and in
providing a specialist service to research bodies across Wales
and beyond. SAIL is hosted by Swansea University and sits
under its auspices for organisational accountability. Strate-
gic direction is provided by the SAIL Management Group with
guidance from an International Scientific Advisory Committee,
and day to day running is managed by an Operations Group.
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Figure 1: The SAIL Secure Research Platform
SAIL operates on a secure research platform (UK SeRP). Beginning at the left of the diagram, wherever researchers are based,
they access data through a provisioned, secure, research ready desktop using VMware Horizon infrastructure. The connection from
the user’s terminal to the desktop is strongly encrypted and access control prevents data being transferred outside the desktop
environment. The end user is authenticated through both user credentials and two factor authentication tokens. Provisioned
desktops come in a variety of capacities and configurations to suit the type of analysis that the end user and project needs. As
part of the research environment there are shared project spaces to enable collaboration through database space, file store, wiki,
Git (source control) as well as access to wider support and help materials.
UK SeRP has many shared infrastructure components that can help deliver the programme’s objectives or specific project needs.
SAIL uses IBM DB2 as its data warehouse due to the massively parallel processing (MPP) architecture and the ability to scale to
suit the needs of such a large repository and the big data needs that this drives. To support specific project needs, other UK SeRP
components can be made available, such as the HPC cluster or Kubernetes cluster to support processing pipelines, or GPU and
AI cluster for training computing models. Through the provision of virtual machines or container environment, SAIL can support
more complex methodological developments that require bespoke infrastructure to support development or deployment of tailored
solutions. Business intelligence tools such as Tableau, R Shiny and PowerBI (not shown) are also available.
Two other UK SeRP instances (Data Science Building projects (DSB) and Dementias Platform UK (DPUK)) are included on
the diagram to help illustrate the customisability of the platform, since these will operate using different components, or other
governance regimens to SAIL.
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Figure 2: The National Research Data Appliance
The various components of the National Research Data Appliance (NRDA) are shown. The entire UK SeRP environment is
controlled by “Security 3 (S3)”, a feature of the National Research Data Appliance (NRDA) allowing the tenancy to be managed
and controlled by non-technical team members. The user accounts and projects are defined and managed through a user inter-
face (shown on the left) allowing different levels of access, even allowing project PI to self-manage project membership. (This
self-management feature is not enabled for SAIL.) This system allows the infrastructure configuration, project configuration and
governance structure to be documented, and all system components orchestrated, through the user interface. Which parts of the
infrastructure are accessible and which projects within that environment are enacted in the particular tenancy model. The S3
model is periodically checked against the infrastructure and any nonconformity is corrected and reported.
The main data protection legislation and regulations with
which SAIL needs to comply are the EU General Data Pro-
tection Regulation [11], the UK Data Protection Act [12] and
the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality (CLDC) [14]. The
UK DPA is read alongside the GDPR to enact the GDPR in
the UK. The CLDC applies in a relationship (such as a doc-
tor/patient consultation) where information is understood to
be given in confidence, and is based on precedent and case law,
rather than being embodied in a statutory document. The
GDPR sets out conditions for the lawful processing of PID,
both general data (such as name) and special categories of
data (such as health records). Anyone processing PID must
be able to justify their lawful basis for doing so under the
GDPR.
As noted above, SAIL does not handle identifiable data.
The mechanism of data provision to SAIL will be described
here, including briefly covering our compliance with legisla-
tive and regulatory requirements. With support from the
SAIL technical team, data providers (e.g. General Practition-
ers, hospital, government departments, etc.) separate their
dataset into two parts: a demographic component (name,
address, date of birth, gender, NHS number) and a content
component (such as medication, diagnoses, educational at-
tainment). The content is sent directly to SAIL. The demo-
graphics are sent to NWIS, acting as a TTP to process the
data on behalf of the data controller (the provider). NWIS is a
National Health Service (NHS) organisation and is authorised
to hold the PID. The only information sent to NWIS is such
that they already hold and it does not include the associated
content data. Because of this, and the separation principle in
that only the original data provider sees the identifiable data
with the associated content, the CLDC is not contravened.
NWIS matches the records against the WDS database and
replaces the demographics with an Anonymous Linking Field
(ALF), based on an encryption of the NHS number. Only the
ALFs with some minimal demographic data (including gender,
week of birth and area of residence to 1500 head of popula-
tion) are sent to SAIL for recombination with the content data.
Because of this, SAIL does not become a data controller for
PID, since we do not have access to, or control over, the data.
Because of the breadth of data held by SAIL, the databank
cannot be considered anonymous in totality. This is not due
to a risk of process reversal to reveal identity, since encryption
precludes this taking place by either SAIL or NWIS. Instead
it is one of attribute re identification (jigsaw attack), whereby
combinations of variables could be used towards re-identifying
individuals. As such, it is a feature of all pseudonymised and
anonymised row-level datasets which retain high utility. For
data processing to prepare anonymised data for researchers,
we rely on the GDPR (Articles 6 and 9) provisions for a task
carried out in the public interest [11]. We arrived at this posi-
tion through a review of our policies and processes, in relation
to the law and with reference to relevant legal cases. This
research was led by a solicitor and it included preparing a brief
for review and opinion by a QC specialising in information law.
We arrived at our position in relation to individual con-
sent through consultation with the Research Ethics Service
[15] and Health & Care Research Wales. SAIL is not required
to seek additional consent to incorporate datasets arising from
routine public service delivery. This is because it is not a re-
search activity per se and data accessed by researchers are
in anonymised form. In accordance with the GDPR, we pro-
vide privacy notices on behalf of data providers (in places such
as in General Practice surgeries). These inform members of
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the public of data use, and individuals are able to opt-out
of their data being provided to SAIL by informing their GP.
The opt-out is enacted between the data provider and NWIS:
in practice we have had less than 0.025% of the population
make this request to date.
SAIL has a longstanding Consumer Panel comprised of
members of the general public [16]. We established the Panel
in 2011 based on consultations to learn from others who had
set up similar structures, such as the Western Australia Data
Linkage Branch [8]. From this, and through developments
over the course of time, the Panel provides SAIL with ad-
vice on data protection issues from the perspective of service
users and carers. We encourage researchers to meet with the
Panel to discuss proposals being developed and receive a pub-
lic viewpoint. The Panel is also represented on an independent
Information Governance Review Panel (IGRP) to ensure that
all proposals to use SAIL data receive a general public opinion.
The IGRP is described in a later section.
Privacy-by-design
Privacy-by-design is an important concept to ensure that an
appropriate set of control measures is built in and applied at
all stages of operations, rather than bolt on solutions [17].
However, that is not to say that a privacy-by-design system is
rigid once created, as controls need to be robust, yet dynamic
and upgradable. The SAIL privacy-by-design model encom-
passes a suite of physical, technical and procedural controls
applied to the data and the data environment. It is evident
from the literature that there are limits on the effectiveness of
controls that can be applied to datasets to mitigate the risk
of disclosure without compromising data utility. A detailed
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but
there is a wealth of literature on the failure of anonymisation
and the privacy risks in purportedly anonymised data through
attribute re-identification [18,19]. Because at the time prece-
dent was even more limited, the ways in which we arrived
at the SAIL privacy-by-design model included combinations
of activities including: consultations with data providers, the
public and other stakeholders, and iterative developments, re-
finement and improvement.
SAIL data are managed within a dedicated building, which
was built to house our population data science initiatives. It
is replete with a set of secure physical safeguards, including
building-level access control, and limits on access to floors and
zones within the building, with particularly strict controls on
who has access to areas where data are prepared and loaded
into SAIL. Technical controls include system-wide security, and
tiered measures applied to control data access by researchers
and monitor conduct with the data. These include the use
of 2-factor authentication to confirm users’ identities through
the use of Yubikeys [20], detailed system logging and query au-
diting, regardless of where the data user is based. SAIL uses
an array of procedural controls including: data sharing agree-
ments with NWIS and with data providers so that responsibil-
ities and expectations are clear, and data access agreements
signed by each researcher to set out the requirements for con-
duct with the data. Breaches of this agreement are dealt with
via standard disciplinary channels. Researchers are subject to
an organisational affiliation check and are required to com-
plete an accredited Safe Researcher training module to work
with SAIL data. All proposals to use SAIL data are put to the
IGRP, from whom a favourable opinion is required before data
access can be granted.
In terms of controls applied to the data, we operate mech-
anisms from the whole system level down to the individual
project level. We re-encrypt the ALFs following their receipt
from NWIS, so that it is not possible for either a SAIL re-
searcher or someone working for NWIS to use SAIL data to re-
verse the process to reveal NHS numbers. We also mask prac-
titioner codes to protect professional reputations and avoid
performance management. In preparing project data for ac-
cess by researchers, we are able to apply a range of controls
and to tailor these to protect the data and retain maximal util-
ity. This includes encrypting all real world codes or anything
that might lead to identification as well as re-encrypting the
ALF again so that researchers running more than one project
cannot use this key to link together datasets from discrete
studies. We also apply data minimisation techniques such as
aggregation (e.g. age to bands) and suppression of variables
or entire records if deemed risky and/or not required to answer
the research question. After data users have completed their
analysis, their proposed outputs are scrutinised for disclosure
risk by a SAIL senior analyst so that results (typically, statis-
tical coefficients, tabulations and graphs, not row-level data)
can be exported from the system.
We have endeavoured to work closely with data providers,
the public and other stakeholders from the outset, as their sat-
isfaction with SAIL is paramount. Since the operation of SAIL
spans all stages from sourcing datasets of interest through to
data archiving, it was essential that we were able to design a
system to safeguard the data, individuals and providers at all
points; not merely to comply with the law, but to engender
and maintain good relationships for ethical conduct and in-
tegrity. As further evidence and assurance of security, we have
also been successful in gaining ISO27001 certification for the
SAIL databank, as well as for the UK SeRP platform.
Data linkage
Linkage of SAIL datasets is by means of the ALF: the unique,
anonymous identifier assigned by NWIS to each person repre-
sented in a dataset following a matching process against the
WDS database. The matching algorithm was co-designed and
tested by NWIS and SAIL. It operates at NWIS, and it is an
automated ‘black box’ system, i.e. no one sees the identifiable
data being processed. Only brief details are given here as the
work is described fully in another publication [21]. We firstly
set out to assess the suitability of using the NHS number as
the basis of a unique identifier, and then to test the algorithm
to match a selection of datasets from primary care, secondary
care and social services against the WDS. The algorithm be-
gins by comparing NHS numbers between the received dataset
and the WDS, and then moves on to further variables: first
name, surname, date of birth, gender and postcode. A UK
postcode covers 15 properties on average but varies by popu-
lation density [22]. Through the process of development, we
were able to refine and apply the algorithm to provide consis-
tently high matching accuracy [21]. A further advantage in
NWIS carrying out the matching process is that ALFs can still
be allocated to datasets deriving from outside the health sec-
tor (such as social services, or education) or where the NHS
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number is otherwise absent. In these cases, the matching
process relies on the further variables and then the NHS num-
ber recorded in the WDS database is allocated to the record.
NWIS maintains the WDS database as part of its service in
providing national data and statistical information for NHS
Wales. Each time a data provider sends a data extract des-
tined for SAIL to NWIS, it is matched against the WDS and
thresholds of match accuracy are sent to SAIL along with the
ALFs and the minimal demographics. In addition to ALFs, we
also have a similar process for allocating unique linkage keys to
residential properties based on postal addresses. Through the
use of these Residential ALFs (RALFs), researchers are able
to associate individuals within the same home, and carry out
health geographic studies without knowing the actual location
of the properties in space [23].
Data sources
SAIL holds a wealth of Wales-wide datasets, designated as
core or core-restricted. The distinction is that data providers
reserve the right to review proposed uses of core-restricted
datasets, in addition to IGRP approval, whereas the use of
core datasets can be approved by the IGRP alone. This is
managed by SAIL staff concurrently with the IGRP process.
The current core and core-restricted datasets are listed in Ap-
pendix 1 with further information available on the SAIL web-
site [24]. Datasets are updated regularly with the periodicity
varying between data providers. In addition, SAIL is able to
incorporate study datasets collected by researchers, provided
that they have obtained all relevant regulatory approvals, in-
cluding consent if applicable, to allow them to transfer the
dataset to SAIL and link it to existing SAIL data. Depending
on the regulatory approvals, access to a study dataset might be
limited to a particular project team or an individual researcher.
Data sources
Access to SAIL data is dependent on a favourable opinion from
the IGRP. This is an independent panel comprising represen-
tatives of professional bodies (such as Public Health Wales),
of regulatory bodies (Research Ethics Service), and members
of the public drawn from the Consumer Panel. It was con-
stituted following consultation with data guardians of major
Welsh datasets. The IGRP assesses the suitability of each
proposal in terms of public interest and sensitivity risk [6,7].
Following their review, proposals may be approved directly,
require amendment before they can proceed, or be refused if
the study plan cannot be revised sufficiently to mitigate con-
cerns. Although ethical approval is not required for the use
of anonymised data in the UK, having an ethics committee
representative on the panel is an additional safeguard as it
means that all proposals are checked. As noted, SAIL also in-
corporates datasets collected for research, and in these cases,
the researcher may be required to seek ethical approval. It is
valuable to us to receive independent opinion on the use of
the data in our aim to be objective and transparent.
Individuals applying for data access are subject to an iden-
tity check to ensure their credibility and organisational affil-
iation. Researchers from the public sector (such as higher
education, the health service, social service, local or national
government, charities) are allowed to access data following all
necessary approvals. Researchers from the private sector are
not allowed direct access to data, but are required to collab-
orate directly with SAIL or another public sector organisation
[7]. Following IGRP and any additional approvals required, an
anonymised project dataset is prepared for the researcher by
a SAIL analyst. SAIL data can be accessed from anywhere a
researcher is based through the use of remote desktop protocol
so that analysis can be carried out in the UK SeRP environ-
ment, sometimes referred to as the SAIL Gateway [7]. Access
within this virtual environment, surrounded by the array of
physical, technical and procedural controls is the standard op-
erating model of SAIL, with results, not row-level data released
externally. This model has proved effective and serves us well
in enabling data access and safeguarding the data. However,
there are occasional cases where a release model is used. For
example, we have provided row-level datasets to other accred-
ited systems such as UK Biobank [25]. But crucially, this only
occurs where the reputation of the recipient is assured and all
relevant approvals, including explicit participant consent, are
in place.
Noteworthy outputs
SAIL is designed to maximise opportunities to conduct longitu-
dinal, cross-sectoral evaluations of services, interventions and
strategies whilst still protecting privacy. It has enabled large-
scale evaluations of the impact of health and social exposures,
natural experiments and policy interventions to be undertaken,
involving billions of records and calculations. These include
development of total or segmented population e-cohorts, em-
bedded trials and studies into health and educational impacts
of natural experiments, including changing density of alcohol
outlets, targeted area regeneration, free school breakfasts, liv-
ing with mental health and alcohol problems, and the impact
of large-scale housing improvements [26-31]. SAIL has over
1,200 registered data users, and the data have been used in
over 300 projects, with approximately 30 new projects each
year. Three varied illustrations are given below.
Research using SAIL has been used to inform National In-
stitute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guidelines and
European Guidelines for the care of patients with ankylos-
ing spondylitis (AS). Previously, disease-modifying drugs could
only be offered to patients having severe disease for at least 3
months, in case the exacerbation was a flare rather than sus-
tained severe disease. However, the work with SAIL showed
that a flare lasts at most 1 month and so concluded that there
is no reason to delay treatment for people beyond this du-
ration, leading to improved options for AS care. It has also
provided estimates of the annual cost of treating AS in the
UK to inform service planning [32-33].
The Welsh Electronic Cohort for Children (WECC) in-
cludes anonymised health records of the >800,000 children
living in Wales between 1990 and 2008 plus education records
from 1994 onwards. This complex cohort enables numerous
research questions to be addressed. For example, WECC has
revealed factors that increase the likelihood of respiratory ad-
missions up to age 5 years; and that children who move house
frequently have an increased risk of poor health and educa-
tional underachievement [34-36].
According to Alzheimer UK, 90% of people with demen-
tia experience behavioural and psychological symptoms and
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that, as a result, they might be prescribed antipsychotic drugs.
However, there is a growing concern about the inappropriate
use of antipsychotics in the elderly. Using SAIL data, increased
risks of serious adverse medical outcomes in older people with
dementia who are exposed to antipsychotic medication were
demonstrated. These results are supporting recommendations
for reducing the use of antipsychotic drugs for people with de-
mentia, which is a key element of the dementia plan for Wales
and a national priority in England [37].
Discussion
The SAIL Databank has been operational since 2007 and has
become an internationally-recognised centre of excellence for
the its safe provision of anonymised datasets for research. It
has received considerable acclaim, such as from the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
and the Council of Canadian Academies [38-40]. However,
we must be cognisant of change in this rapidly evolving area,
and to be responsive and dynamic, so we continually learn and
improve.
Lessons learned
We outline some of the significant lessons we have experi-
enced, and the application of the learning, for continual im-
provement in running the SAIL Databank:
• Lesson: Legislative and regulatory frameworks for data
protection and the conduct of research change from time
to time, for example, the enactment of the GDPR in
2018. Such changes can present a challenge in them-
selves, such as needing to ensure an appropriate lawful
basis for data processing under new legal provisions, but
the ways in which frameworks may be interpreted by
gatekeepers carry their own challenges and can hinder
research [41].
• Application: We carried out a piece of legal research
and consulted a QC for advice on our lawful position
under the GDPR. We did not need to make material
changes to the operation of SAIL, but we did need to
update our policies to reflect the new provision. We
have been able to use this information when responding
to queries from data providers to support them in their
due diligence processes for the lawful provision of data
in compliance with the GDPR.
• Lesson: Technological advances have the potential for
greater safeguards but also greater threats. There is
an array of hardware and software solutions to protect,
manage and provide safe access to data in a secure envi-
ronment. But, it is well-known that systems are subject
to multiple external threats, such as from hacks, trojans,
viruses or malware [42].
• Application: We have designed the SAIL Databank to
be surrounded by multiple, tiered security mechanisms.
These include: monitoring internet traffic so that attack
attempts can be blocked; blocking suspect IP addresses
and web domains; multi-vender internal & perimeter
firewalls; network segmentation; weekly automated pen-
etration & vulnerability scanning; automated patching
and antivirus; secured infrastructure wide system log-
ging; closed circuit television (CCTV); and delegated
management of building access control; as well as regu-
larly and reviewing and updating our security protocols.
• Lesson: The expansion of existing data and the growing
availability of new and emerging data types (such as ge-
nomic, free-text clinical data and non-health administra-
tive data) open up enhanced opportunities for research
but, along with other commitments, require increases in
analytical capacity and skills on limited budgets.
• Application: We have expanded the skill base amongst
our analysts by means of PhD studentships, self-directed
and team-based learning, and time-limited project in-
vestments through a variety of funders. However, with
the demands on SAIL data, this remains a perennial
problem, requiring further investment for expansion sus-
tainability.
• Lesson: Societal views on data sharing are complex,
evolving and depend on many factors, such as personal
preferences, cultural values and the influence of mass
media [43]. Public trust is paramount if debacles such as
care.data, where insufficient information was provided,
are to be avoided [44,45]. Even so, it is not enough
merely to convey information, but to engage in an ongo-
ing public dialogue, since demonstrating trustworthiness
is necessary to engender trust.
• Application: We have a programme of public involve-
ment and engagement (PI/E) including: a Consumer
Panel to advise on our work; research studies focused
on public engagement to assess public views and gain
input; surgeries to guide researchers on including PI/E;
and a series of public-facing research case studies. This
programme is tailored to meet the needs of the public
in varying contexts and settings for effective two-way
communication.
Further work
The work of SAIL is ongoing across all aspects of its opera-
tion as we strive for continual improvement in service provision
and research outputs. We provide examples of challenges from
three work areas, noting that it is beyond the scope of this pa-
per to provide anything other than a brief description here.
New and emerging data types
The incorporation of emerging data types brings particular
challenges, which we illustrate in relation to genomic and free-
text data. Unlike structured microdata, where specified types
of variable are entered in data fields, native genomic and free-
text data exist in different formats. Genomic data can range
widely from sequence to presence / absence of a genetic trait.
Variant call format (VCF) files are text files describing the po-
sition, number and type of variants are valuable for research
alongside structured phenotypic and lifestyle data. Free-text
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data are recorded in the course of public service and care pro-
vision, and include examples such as clinic letters and prac-
titioners’ notes. What these data types have in common is
that they can be more difficult to de-identify reliably than
coded data [46-48]. We have teams of researchers working
on methodologies, data governance and social acceptability to
create solutions for SAIL.
Alternative means to enable data access
Although SAIL operates as a data repository, some data can-
not be provided to the databank via our standard mechanisms
using the separation principles and the use of a TTP to handle
the PID. This can occur when there is no legal gateway for the
movement of the PID pertaining to certain datasets from gov-
ernment departments, or when research access to data held at
another data centre is required in conjunction with SAIL data.
In these cases, we need to find alternative means to enable
data access. We are using two approaches to address this is-
sue. One involves using methodologies for privacy-preserving
record linkage (PPRL) developed at Curtin University (West-
ern Australia) based on Bloom filters [49,50]. In this way, only
one-way hashed PID would be moved. The other involves the
development of federated data access, rather than moving the
data. A variety of options is being explored including inter-
centre connections to allow a researcher to access data held at
multiple sites, or to enable queries to be applied to distributed
data [51].
Efficiency and sustainability
Budget constants and rapid multi-faceted developments in the
data and societal landscapes are constant challenges and re-
quire ongoing effort and adaptation. These are embodied in
issues such as how to: be efficient in meeting the requirements
of multiple programmes and funders; enable safe access to
highly granular data to maximise research potential; and meet
the needs of varied research communities. We endeavour to
take a ‘do once, use many times’ approach, as per the flexible,
multi-functional UK SeRP and NRDA developments. This is a
pattern we follow across the other centres we host so that we
don’t work in silos but share learning and expertise to avoid
duplication of effort. We also highly value opportunities for
collaboration and mutual learning such as those afforded by
the International Population Data Linkage Network (IPDLN).
Conclusions
SAIL provides a working example of an extensive, whole pop-
ulation data resource for research. The data are being used
widely in a range of studies focusing on determinants of health
and well-being. Its privacy-by-design model and UK SeRP
technology have received international acclaim, and we con-
tinually endeavour to demonstrate trustworthiness to support
data provider assurance and public acceptability in data use.
Further developments are underway to open up new opportu-
nities and to streamline our processes. We strive for further
improvement and continue a mutual learning process with our
contemporaries in this rapidly developing field.
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Appendix 1. SAIL core and core-restricted datasets
The following is a summary of the core and core-restricted datasets held in the SAIL Databank. Further information can be found
at: https://saildatabank.com/saildata/sail-datasets/
The information shown was retrieved on 23 May 2019.
Core datasets Features (with approximate volumes)
Annual District Birth
Extract
Office for National Statistics (ONS) register of all births in Wales collected from birth regis-
trations. 35,000 births per year, from 2003 to present.
Annual District Death
Extract
ONS register of all deaths relating to Welsh residents, including those that died out of Wales,
collected from death registrations. 32,000 births per year, from 2003 to present.
Critical Care Dataset Nation-wide critical care database to monitor quality of service, to drive improvements and
policy development, collected and coded at each hospital. 9,000 admissions per year, from
April 2006 to May 2016.
Diagnostic and Therapy
Services Waiting Times
Waiting times for specified diagnostic and therapy services for the NHS in Wales, submitted
by Local Health Boards. 120,000 records per year from October 2005 to May 2016.
Emergency Department Administrative and clinical information for all NHS Wales Accident and Emergency depart-




Birth registration and monitoring of child health examinations and immunisations, bringing
together data from local Child Health System databases, held by Local Health Boards. 35,000
births and 500,000 vaccinations per year, from 1987 to present.
Outpatient Dataset Attendance information for all NHS Wales hospital outpatient appointments, collected from
the central PAS (Patient Administrative System). 4,500,000 appointments per year from
2004 to present.
Outpatient Referral Referral pathways to secondary care, submitted by Local Health Boards. 1,000,000 records
per year, from 2009 to Jun 2016.
Patient Episode Database
for Wales
NHS Wales hospital admissions comprising attendance and clinical information, diagnoses
and operations performed, collected from the central PAS (Patient Administrative System).
950,000 hospital admissions per year, from 1997 to present.
Postponed Admitted
Procedures
Information on reason for cancelled admitted procedures, submitted by Local Health Boards.
80,000 records per year, from 2013 to May 2016.
Primary Care GP dataset Signs, symptoms, test results, diagnoses, prescribed treatment, referrals for specialist treat-
ment and social aspects relating to the patient’s home environment, collected from General
Practices. Averaging around 5000 patients per practice, from between January 2000 to Oc-
tober 2014 (depending on practice) to present.
Referral to Treatment
Times
Monitoring the 26-week referral to treatment time target, submitted by Local Health Boards.
450,000 records per year, from September 2011 to May 2016.
UK Health Dimensions NHS related lookup tables, including version 2 and version 3 Read codes, ICD10 codes,
cross-coding system mappings, organisational information, and geographic information, from
various reference data providers. Comprises thousands of reference tables.
Welsh Demographic Service
Dataset
Administrative information about individuals in Wales that use NHS services, drawn from
GP practices. Current and past population of Wales, from 1990 to present (approximately 5
million people).
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Core-restricted datasets Features (with approximate volumes)
Active Adult Survey Large scale survey of the adult population in Wales covering sport related activities, provided
by Sport Wales. Data on 13,000 individuals between January 2012 and January 2013.
Bowel Screening Wales Administrative and clinical information for bowel screening, collected by Public Health Wales.
140,000 screening test records per year, from 2008 onwards.
Breast Test Wales Administrative and clinical information for breast screening, collected by Public Health Wales.
110,000 screening test records per year, from 1989 onwards.
Cervical Screening Wales Administrative and clinical information for cervical screening, collected by Public Health




Information about foetuses or babies who has or is suspected of having a congenital anomaly,
collected by CARIS. 1,500 babies per year, from 1998 to 2011.
Educational Attainment Annual return submitted by all sectors including nursery, primary, middle, secondary and
special schools, provided by Welsh Government. 470,000 records per year, from 2003 to
2015.
National Survey for Wales The Welsh Government’s major survey of the general population in Wales covering a wide





National Cancer Registry for Wales to record, store and report on all incidences of cancer,
collected by WCISU. 686,000 records, from 1972 to present.
Welsh Health Survey Information on the health and health-related lifestyles of people living in Wales, collected by
the National Centre for Social Research. 4,400 records from April 2013 to December 2014.
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